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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

Deputy Director for National Foreign Assessment

NFAC 1628-80/1
6 March 1980

File

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

VIA: Deputy Director for National Foreign Assessment
National Intelligence Officer for Warning

FROM: 25X1

Special Assistant for Nuclear Proliferation Intelligence

SUBJECT: Warning Report--Nuclear Proliferation ☐ 25X1

1. Action Requested: None; for your information only. ☐ 25X1

2. Background: The Interagency Intelligence Working Group on Nuclear Proliferation met on 21 February 1980 to discuss warning matters. Attached is my report based in large part on the discussions that took place. (U)

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Attachment: a/s

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SECRET [REDACTED]

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Pakistan. There have been no signs of the altering of the scope or pace of the nuclear program. In particular, there have been no indications of any slowing of the work on the uranium enrichment plant at Kahuta, although President Zia recently was reported to have expressed dissatisfaction with progress in the overall nuclear program. There is continuing resistance by the Zia government to the inspection, under international auspices, of the spent nuclear fuel in storage at the Karachi power plant. This raises the possibility that the Pakistanis might be hiding illicit activity, e.g., secret attempts to divert some of the spent fuel for the extraction of its plutonium content. [REDACTED]

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India. The new government probably has not yet concentrated its attention on its nuclear policy, i.e., whether or not it should pursue a nuclear weapons development and testing program. As soon as it has consolidated its position, it is likely to develop options for pursuing efforts to prevent or counteract the Pakistanis acquiring a nuclear explosives capability. It is not clear what form these might take. In any case, Indian officials probably now perceive that Pakistan will lack fissile material for a nuclear test device for some time to come. They therefore might not now be disposed to treat the matter urgently. [REDACTED]

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Iraq. The Baghdad government is continuing its push to acquire nuclear materials and technology from other countries, and seems to be effectively using oil supplies (e.g., with Italy) as a lever in the process. As Iraq absorbs more and more nuclear know-how, especially in sensitive activities, Israel is likely to strengthen its efforts to get the US and others to take steps to stop Iraq from eventually acquiring the capacity to produce nuclear explosive devices. Although it lacks oil leverage on Pakistan, Iraq is looking for whatever nuclear cooperation it can get from the Pakistanis. [REDACTED]

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*This memorandum is produced periodically by the Special Assistant to the DD/NFA for Nuclear Proliferation Intelligence. Its purpose is to review possible developments in the short-term future that would be damaging to US interests. Obviously, many of these developments will not occur in the time frame or in the manner suggested, or will not occur at all.

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Argentina/Brazil. The prospective nuclear cooperation agreement between these countries probably will not entail any exchanges regarding the sensitive areas of reprocessing and enrichment technologies. Both sides probably hope that the agreement will have the benefit of removing pressure on them from the US and other nuclear supplier countries who are suspicious about Argentine and Brazilian intentions; in particular, the possibility that they are in a race to develop nuclear weaponry as the most dangerous expression of their mutual distrust. [REDACTED]

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South Africa. The government in Pretoria probably is feeling no serious pressure to sign the NPT or to accept safeguards on South African nuclear facilities. South Africa will therefore likely continue what amount to stalling tactics in its dealings with the US on nuclear cooperation. [REDACTED]

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SECRET [REDACTED]

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